

REMARKS/ARGUMENTS

The Examiner noted that one definition of translucent (def. 2a) is transparent and thus asserts that the prior art (Vyncke) is not distinguished by the claims. Applicant notes that an alternate definition, and one more compatible with the present specification's meaning is def. 3: "admitting and diffusing light so that object beyond cannot be clearly distinguished; partly transparent." This is made evident by the repeated references to "transparent or translucent" throughout the specification. It would not make sense for one to write "transparent *or* transparent," showing that "translucent" cannot be synonymous with "transparent" here. To make this distinction clearer, applicant has substituted the term "semi-transparent" for the term "translucent" throughout the claims.

Because Vyncke does not teach or suggest a semi-transparent object, the claims are now distinguishable from the prior art.

Applicant respectfully requests that a timely Notice of Allowance be issued in this case.

Respectfully submitted,



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